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Impeaching a Federal Judge:
Some Lessons from History
Arthur D. Hellman
Abstract
In August 2014, Federal District Judge Mark Fuller was arrested on a charge of
misdemeanor battery after his wife called 911 from an Atlanta hotel room and told the
operator, “He’s beating on me.” Judge Fuller has agreed to enter a pre-trial diversion
program; if he completes the program, the criminal case against him will be dismissed.
But Judge Fuller may face other consequences. The Acting Chief Judge of the Eleventh
Circuit has initiated proceedings under the federal judicial misconduct statute. And
some members of Congress and editorial writers have said that if Judge Fuller does not
resign from the bench, Congress should begin impeachment proceedings.
Federal judges serve during “good behavior,” and they can be impeached and
removed from office only for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.” If the domestic-violence charges are substantiated, would that
constitute an impeachable offense?
In this statement, submitted at a hearing of the Task Force on Judicial
Impeachment of the House Judiciary Committee, the author addresses some of the
questions raised by a proposal to impeach a federal judge. What is the meaning of the
constitutional language? No one argues that Judge Fuller has committed treason or
bribery, so the question is whether his conduct falls within the category of “other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.” The author discusses the evidence from the founding
generation and from the commentators, and he briefly surveys the impeachment
precedents. These historical materials suggest two broad (and overlapping) categories of
conduct that may justify impeachment. The first is serious abuse of power. The second
is conduct that demonstrates that an official is “unworthy to fill” the office that he holds.
Another question is the relevance of the pending criminal charges. Can the House
rely on a criminal conviction as the basis for impeachment? Can the House proceed with
impeachment if the criminal charges are dropped? The author concludes that the House
must exercise an independent judgment; it is not bound by determinations of other
actors in other proceedings.
The statement was submitted to the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment at a
hearing on the possible impeachment of Judge Samuel B. Kent of the Southern District
of Texas. The written statement is followed by supplementary material that includes the
author’s oral testimony and the colloquies that followed. Based on the testimony at the
hearing and other evidence, the House approved four articles of impeachment. Judge
Kent resigned from the bench before his Senate trial.
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Statement of
Arthur D. Hellman
Chairman Schiff, Ranking Member Goodlatte, and Members of the Task Force:
Thank you for inviting me to express my views at this hearing held to
consider the possible impeachment of Samuel B. Kent, a judge of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
On May 11, 2009, Judge Kent was convicted on one felony count of
obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The conviction was
based on a guilty plea in which Judge Kent admitted that he gave false testimony
to a special committee of the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council that was investigating a
complaint of judicial misconduct that had been filed against Judge Kent. Judge
Kent was sentenced to a term of 33 months in prison. At the sentencing hearing,
two witnesses – both employees at the Galveston courthouse where Judge Kent
was the only resident Article III judge – described repeated instances of sexual
abuse by Judge Kent.
In my view, based on the public record, Judge Kent has engaged in conduct
that justifies impeachment, conviction, and removal from office under Article II of
the Constitution. First, the conduct that Judge Kent acknowledged as part of the
guilty plea proceedings – making false statements to a judiciary investigating body
– is, without more, a sufficient basis for impeachment because it demonstrates
Judge Kent’s unfitness for judicial office. In addition, if the House credits the
testimony of the two victims who testified at the sentencing hearing, the sexual
assaults and other unwanted sexual contact demonstrate not only unfitness for
office but also abuse of power. They thus constitute a second, independent basis
for impeachment.
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Before elaborating on these points, I will say a few words by way of personal
background. I am a professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law,
where I was recently appointed as the inaugural holder of the Sally Ann Semenko
Endowed Chair. I have been studying the operation of the federal courts for more
than 30 years. Since 2007 I have published three articles dealing with judicial
misconduct and other aspects of federal judicial ethics. In November 2001, I
testified at a hearing of the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property on “Operation of the Judicial Misconduct Statutes.” Subsequent to that
hearing, Chairman Coble, joined by Ranking Member Berman, introduced the
bipartisan Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, which became law as part of the
21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-273. More recently, I testified at the hearing held to consider the possible
impeachment of District Judge Manuel L. Real.
I. Background: Investigating Misconduct by Federal Judges
For most of the nation’s history, the only formal mechanism for dealing with
allegations of misconduct by federal judges was the cumbersome process of
impeachment. Criminal prosecution was a theoretical possibility, but up to 1980,
“no sitting federal judge was ever prosecuted and convicted of a crime committed
while in office.”1 A 1939 statute created judicial councils within the circuits, but

1

Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 152 F.R.D. 265,
326 (1993) [hereinafter National Commission Report]. In 1939, Judge Martin T. Manton of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was convicted of crimes committed while he served as a federal
judge, but he resigned from the bench before the criminal prosecution began. See Joseph Borkin,
THE CORRUPT JUDGE 27, 45 (1962). Since 1980, four federal judges (in addition to Judge Kent)
have been convicted of crimes committed while in office. Two (Harry Claiborne and Walter
Nixon) were impeached and removed from office. One (Robert Collins) resigned from the bench,
and one (Robert Aguilar) retired “on salary.”

May 31, 2009

Hellman – Kent Impeachment Hearing – Page 3

their powers were vaguely defined, particularly with respect to authority over
individual judges.2
In the mid-1970s, prominent members of Congress came to the conclusion
that the impeachment process did not provide an adequate remedy for the many
possible varieties of misconduct that might arise. After extensive debate, Congress
passed the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980 (1980 Act). This law established a new set of procedures for judicial
discipline and vested primary responsibility for implementing them in the federal
judicial circuits.
Of particular relevance here, the 1980 Act created a system that relied on the
judiciary itself to carry out initial investigations of possible misconduct, even
where impeachment might ultimately be warranted. As Senator Thurmond
observed, the procedures established by the Act “would serve to isolate the most
serious instances of misconduct and to actually set before the House of
Representatives a record of proceedings revealing misconduct which might
constitute an impeachable offense.”3
Two decades later, Congress passed a revised version of the Act in the
Judicial Improvements Act of 2002.4 This legislation retained the framework of
the 1980 Act but added some procedural details drawn from provisions adopted by

2

See Peter Graham Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration 417-26 (1973);
Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1969).
3

126 Cong. Rec. 28097 (Sen. Thurmond).

4

The legislation was enacted as part of the 21st Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273. The standalone version was passed by
the House in July 2002 as H.R. 3892. For the legislative history, see H.R. Rep. 107-459 (2002).
As noted in the text, I testified at the hearing that preceded the introduction of the bill.
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the judiciary through rulemaking. The new law also gave the judicial misconduct
provisions their own chapter in the United States Code, Chapter 16.
Under Chapter 16 and the implementing rules, the primary responsibility for
identifying and remedying possible misconduct by federal judges rests with two
sets of actors: the chief judges of the federal judicial circuits and the circuit
judicial councils.5 A national entity—the Judicial Conference of the United
States—becomes involved only in rare cases, and only in an appellate capacity.6
Ordinarily, the process begins with the filing of a complaint about a judge
with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit.7 The clerk must “promptly
transmit” the complaint to the chief judge of the circuit, and the chief judge must
“expeditiously” review it. As part of that review, the chief judge “may conduct a
limited inquiry” but must not “make findings of fact about any matter that is
reasonably in dispute.” Based on that review and limited inquiry, the chief judge
may dismiss the complaint or terminate the proceedings. That, indeed, is what
happens in the overwhelming majority of cases, typically because the complaint is
frivolous or seeks only to challenge the merits of a judicial decision.

5

For a detailed description and analysis of procedures under the Act, see Arthur D. Hellman,
When Judges Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal Judicial Misconduct Rules, 22
Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol. 325 (2008).
Chapter 16 also authorizes the circuit judicial councils to “refer” complaints to the Judicial
Conference of the United States and to “certify” determinations that a judge has engaged in
serious misconduct. See 28 U.S.C. § 354(b) (Supp. V 2005). Technically this section of the
statute does not establish a channel of appellate review, but even here the council makes the
initial decision, and the Judicial Conference becomes involved only after that decision has been
made. At this writing, the Fifth Circuit’s certification in the Kent matter is pending before the
Judicial Conference.
6

The Act also provides that the chief judge of the circuit may “identify a complaint” and
thus initiate the investigatory process even when no complaint has been filed by a litigant or
anyone else. That aspect of the Act does not come into play in the matter now under consideration
by the Task Force.
7
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If the chief judge does not dismiss the complaint or terminate the proceeding,
he or she must promptly appoint a “special committee” to “investigate the facts
and allegations contained in the complaint.”8 A special committee is composed of
the chief judge and equal numbers of circuit and district judges of the circuit.
Special committees have power to issue subpoenas; sometimes they hire private
counsel to assist in their inquiries.
After conducting its investigation, the special committee files a report with
the circuit council. The report must include the findings of the investigation as
well as recommendations. The circuit council then has a variety of options: it may
conduct its own investigation; it may dismiss the complaint; or it may take action
including the imposition of sanctions.
Final authority within the judicial system rests with the Judicial Conference
of the United States. A complainant or judge who is aggrieved by an order of the
circuit council can file a petition for review by the Conference. In addition, the
circuit council can refer serious matters to the Conference on its own motion. If
the Conference determines that “consideration of impeachment may be
warranted,” it may so certify to the House of Representatives.9
One final point about the process: Congress has authorized the Conference to
delegate its review power to a standing committee, and the Conference has done
so.10 The committee is the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. But it is

8

See 28 U.S.C. § 353.

9

See 28 U.S.C. § 355(b).

10

See 28 U.S.C. § 331; see also In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 37 F.3d 1511 (U.S.
Jud. Conference 1994).
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the Conference itself that takes the grave step of certifying to the House its
determination that consideration of impeachment may be warranted.11
II. The Accusations and the Procedural History
This impeachment proceeding has its origin in a judicial misconduct
complaint filed on May 21, 2007, by Cathy McBroom, Judge Kent’s case
manager.12 Ms. McBroom alleged that she had been sexually harassed by Judge
Kent. In response to the complaint, Chief Judge Edith Hollan Jones of the Fifth
Circuit appointed a special committee to conduct an investigation of the
allegations.
At some point during that investigation, the special committee notified Judge
Kent “of an expansion of the original complaint … to investigate instances of
alleged inappropriate behavior toward other employees of the federal judicial
system.”13 Either before or after that notification, Judge Kent requested an
opportunity to appear before the special committee. The special committee granted
his request. What happened next is described in the “Factual Basis for Plea”
signed by Judge Kent and also by his counsel:
As part of its investigation, the Committee and the Judicial Council
sought to learn from defendant KENT and others whether defendant
KENT had engaged in unwanted sexual contact with Person A and
individuals other than Person A.

11

On June 18, 2008, the Conference certified its determination that consideration of
impeachment of District Judge Thomas G. Porteous may be warranted.
Ms. McBroom is referred to in many of the documents as “Person A.” She identified
herself as “Person A” in open court at the sentencing hearing in the criminal case. See Transcript
of Sentencing Before the Hon. C. Roger Vinson, United States District Judge 45 (May 11, 2009)
[hereinafter Sentencing Transcript].
12

13

In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, Dkt. No. 07-05-351-0086, Sept. 28, 2007, at 2
[hereinafter September 2007 Order].
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On June 8, 2007, in Houston, Texas, [Judge Kent] appeared before
the Special Investigative Committee of the Fifth Circuit.
[Kent] falsely testified regarding his unwanted sexual contact with
Person B by stating to the Committee that the extent of his non-consensual
contact with Person B was one kiss, when in fact and as he knew the
defendant had engaged in repeated non-consensual sexual contact with
Person B without her permission.
[Kent] also falsely testified regarding his unwanted sexual contact
with Person B by stating to the Committee that when told by Person B that
his advances were unwelcome, no further contact occurred, when in fact
and as he knew the defendant continued his non-consensual contacts even
after she asked him to stop.
Three months after Judge Kent’s appearance before the special committee,
the special committee filed its report with the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit.
Judge Kent submitted a response to the report. Based on the report and the
response, the Judicial Council, on Sept. 27, 2007, issued a public order
“reprimand[ing] Judge Kent for the conduct that the report describes.”14 The
report itself was not made public, and the Judicial Council order did not describe
the misconduct. The Judicial Council “concluded [the] proceedings because
appropriate remedial action had been and will be taken, including but not limited
to the Judge’s four-month leave of absence from the bench, reallocation of the
Galveston/Houston docket and other measures.”15
Ms. McBroom filed a motion for reconsideration of the misconduct order.
She alleged that there was additional evidence of misconduct by Judge Kent,
including conduct that might constitute grounds for impeachment. Meanwhile, the
United States Department of Justice initiated a criminal investigation of Judge

14

September 2007 Order at 2.

15

Id.
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Kent. On Dec. 20, 2007, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council deferred action on the
motion for reconsideration “in light of the ongoing investigation.”
The criminal investigation proceeded, and on Aug. 28, 2008, a grand jury
indicted Judge Kent on two counts of abusive sexual contact and one count of
attempted aggravated sexual abuse. All three counts involved abusive sexual
behavior that took place in the United States Courthouse in Galveston; the victim
was “Person A” – Cathy McBroom, the original complainant. Judge Kent pleaded
“not guilty.”
Three months later, on Jan. 6, 2009, the grand jury returned a superseding
indictment. The new indictment reiterated the three counts of the August
indictment and added three more. Counts Four and Five alleged that Judge Kent
committed offenses of “aggravated sexual abuse” and “abusive sexual contact.”
These counts, like those in the initial indictment, involved conduct at the
Galveston courthouse, but the victim was “Person B,” later identified as Donna
Wilkerson. The final count alleged obstruction of justice – specifically, that Judge
Kent made false statements to the Fifth Circuit special committee about the nature
and extent of his “unwanted sexual contact with Person B.” Once again Judge
Kent pleaded “not guilty” to all of the charges.
Three days after the grand jury handed down its superseding indictment, the
Fifth Circuit Judicial Council issued a brief order granting Cathy McBroom’s
motion for reconsideration of the September 2007 misconduct order. The Council
explained that when that order was issued, the special committee and the Council
were unaware of the “allegations of serious misconduct” added by the superseding
indictment. The new order said that after the trial in the criminal prosecution, the
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Council would investigate the new charges and, if necessary, impose further
sanctions.
The criminal trial was scheduled to begin on Feb. 23, 2009. Instead, on that
day Judge Kent appeared in court and pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice. As
part of the guilty plea, Judge Kent signed a document captioned “Factual Basis for
Plea.” In the latter document, Judge Kent admitted that had “engaged in nonconsensual sexual contact” with both Person A and Person B “without their
permission.” He also admitted that in his appearance before the special committee
of the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council he “falsely testified regarding his unwanted
sexual contact with Person B.” For its part, the Government agreed “to seek
dismissal of Counts One through Five of the Superseding Indictment after
sentencing.” The Government also agreed “that the maximum term of
imprisonment that it may seek at sentencing is three years.”
Sentencing took place on May 11, 2009. Judge C. Roger Vinson ruled that
Cathy McBroom and Donna Wilkerson would be recognized as “victims” for
purposes of the sentencing hearing.16 This meant that both women would have an
opportunity to speak, and both did. Each described a history of abuse, assaults, and
lies by Judge Kent. Judge Kent spoke briefly. He apologized to his staff, to his
colleagues, and “to all who seek redress in the federal system.” Judge Vinson then
sentenced him to 33 months in prison.
On May 27, 2009, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council issued an order
“determin[ing]” that Judge Kent “has … by his own admission engaged in conduct
which constitutes one or more grounds for impeachment under Article II of the

See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). Under that statute, a “crime victim” has the right “to be
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving … sentencing.”
16
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Constitution.” The Council certified its determination to the Judicial Conference
of the United States and urged the Conference to “take expeditious action” to
certify the matter to the House of Representatives. On the same day, Chief Judge
Jones rejected Judge Kent’s request that she certify him as disabled pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 372(a).
Based on this record, it appears that the Task Force will be considering the
possibility of drawing up articles of impeachment seeking Judge Kent’s conviction
and removal from office on three grounds:
1. Judge Kent made false statements to a special committee of the
Fifth Circuit Judicial Council that was investigating a complaint of
judicial misconduct against him. These false statements betrayed his trust
as a judicial officer and impeded an investigation that was being carried
out pursuant to an Act of Congress.
2. Judge Kent abused his position as a federal judge by engaging in
non-consensual sexual contact with Cathy McBroom, an employee of the
court that he supervised, on court premises.17
3. Judge Kent abused his position as a federal judge by engaging in
non-consensual sexual contact with Donna Wilkerson, an employee of the
court that he supervised, on court premises.
The question for the House, and for the Task Force in the first instance, is
whether this behavior falls within the category of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” that warrant the impeachment of Judge Kent under Article II of
the Constitution. The remainder of this statement addresses that question.

I have drawn here and in the next paragraph on the language used in the “Factual Basis for
Plea” that Judge Kent and his counsel signed. Testimony at the Task Force hearing may support a
stronger version of the sexual misconduct articles.
17
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III. The Constitutional Framework
The starting point for consideration of the possible impeachment of an
Article III judge is of course the Constitution of the United States. Four provisions
of the Constitution are relevant.
The first is the judicial tenure provision of Article III. Section 1 of Article III
provides:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.18
Implicitly, this language is supplemented by Article II section 4:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
The process of impeachment is governed by two sections of Article I.
Section 2 provides: “The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole power of
impeachment.” Section 3 adds:
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When
sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the
members present.
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust or profit under the United States: but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and
punishment, according to law.

18

In this statement I shall use the modern spelling of “behavior.”
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The interpretation and interaction of these constitutional provisions has
generated a voluminous body of scholarship and commentary. For present
purposes, I take four propositions as established.
First, it has been accepted at least since the early 19th century that federal
judges are included among the “civil Officers” who are subject to impeachment
and removal under Article II. Justice Joseph Story wrote in his authoritative
treatise:
All officers of the United States ... who hold their appointments
under the national government, whether their duties are executive or
judicial, in the highest or in the lowest departments of the government,
with the exception of officers in the army and navy, are properly civil
officers within the meaning of the constitution, and liable to
impeachment.19
As already noted, on May 27, 2009, Chief Judge Jones rejected Judge Kent’s
request that she certify him as disabled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(a). This means
that Judge Kent will not be permitted to retire on the basis of disability. But even
if Judge Kent had been allowed to invoke § 372(a), that would not have affected
these impeachment proceedings. A judge who retires under § 372(a) is no longer
in “regular active service,” but he would still “hold [his] appointment[] under the
national government.” And Justice Story’s language makes clear that he would
still be a “civil officer[] within the meaning of the constitution, and liable to
impeachment.”20

19

2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 790 at 258
(1833) (citing Rawle).
20

In addition, as Chief Judge Jones noted, a judge who retires under § 372(a) is still eligible
to perform judicial work (although he could not do so unless designated and assigned by the chief
judge).
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Second, the impeachment process delineated in Articles I and II is the sole
means of removing a federal judge from office. That is the view of most
commentators; it was also the conclusion of the National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal established by Congress and chaired by former
Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, the principal author of the 1980 Act. After
extensive study and discussion, the Commission wrote:
The Commission believes that removal may be effected only through
the impeachment process. By “removal,” the Commission means anything
that relieves the judge of the aspects of office provided for in the
Constitution--namely, the judge’s commission of office, with its
accompanying eligibility to exercise the judicial power, and nonreducible
compensation.21
I recognize that Professor Raoul Berger took a different view in his 1973 book on
impeachment,22 but later scholars have persuasively rejected his arguments (and in
particular his reliance on the common law writ of scire facias).23
Third, when Congress acts under the impeachment powers of Article I, its
actions are not subject to judicial review. In Nixon v. United States,24 the Supreme
Court held that the meaning of the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial Clause is
nonjusticiable. More broadly, the Court found that “the Judiciary, and the Supreme
Court in particular, were not chosen [by the Framers] to have any role in
impeachments.”25 This underscores the unique and solemn responsibility that

21

National Commission Report, supra note 1, at 287.

22

Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 135-65 (1973).

23

See, e.g., David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a
“Golden Parachute,” 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 1397, 1406-08 (2005).
24

506 U.S. 224 (1993).

25

Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
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devolves upon the House – and upon this Task Force as its agent – when it is
considering a proposal to impeach a federal judge.
Finally, although the precise relationship between the “good behavior”
clause of Article III and the impeachment provision of Article II will never be
settled definitively, it is generally accepted that the power of Congress to impeach
and remove a federal judge can be exercised only for the “gravest cause”26 or for
“very serious abuses.”27 This follows from the Framers’ concern for protecting
judicial independence. It can be seen in the emphatic rejection by the
Constitutional Convention of John Dickinson’s proposal to add, after the “good
behavior” provision in what is now Article III, the following qualification:
“provided that [the Judges] may be removed by the Executive on the application
[of] the Senate and House of Representatives.” One delegate after another objected
to Dickinson’s motion. Said James Wilson: “The Judges would be in a bad
situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in the two
branches of our [Government].” Edmund Randolph “opposed the motion as
weakening too much the independence of the Judges.” Only one state voted for the
motion; seven voted against it.28
Two conclusions follow from this analysis. First, if Judge Kent refuses to
resign and is not impeached and convicted, he will remain an Article III judge and
will draw his full salary.29 When he reaches the age of 65, he would be able to
26

John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39
Fordham L. Rev. 1, 30 (1970) (footnote omitted).
Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining “Good Behavior” for
Federal Judges, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 765, 777 (1989) (emphasis in original).
27

28

The account in this paragraph is based on 2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 at 428-29 (1911); and Feerick, supra note 26, at 21.
29

It is likely that Judge Kent will be disbarred, but there is no requirement that a district
judge be a member of the bar. Judge Harry Claiborne was never disbarred in Nevada, even
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“retire from the office … and …, during the remainder of his lifetime, receive an
annuity equal to the salary he was receiving at the time he retired.”30 Second,
Judge Kent can be convicted and removed from office only if the accusations
against him fall within the category of “very serious abuses” that justify
impeachment. The next question, therefore, is whether the accusations do fall
within that category.
IV. The Meaning of “Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors”
Under the Constitution, Judge Kent may be impeached and removed from
office only for “Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.” No
one argues that Judge Kent has committed acts of treason or bribery. The question,
therefore, is whether his conduct falls within the constitutional category of “high
crimes and misdemeanors.”
One way of approaching this question would be to look at each word
separately. What are “high crimes”? What did the Framers mean by the word
“misdemeanors”? Does the adjective “high” modify “misdemeanors” as well as
“crimes”? However, based on my study of the relevant materials, I believe that
this approach is misguided. The preferable approach is to interpret the phrase
holistically and to ask: what kinds of behavior, other than treason and bribery, fall
within the realm of “very serious abuses” that justify impeachment of a federal
judge? In pursuing this course, I rely on evidence from the Founding Generation,
writings by leading commentators, and prior impeachments.

though he was convicted of a felony by a federal criminal jury and also convicted and removed
from office by the Senate in an impeachment proceeding.
See 28 U.S.C. § 371(a). Conceivably he could seek to “retain the office but retire from
regular active service.” See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b).
30
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A. Evidence from the Founding Generation
Initially the impeachments clause provided for impeachment only on the
basis of treason or bribery. George Mason argued that this was too limited:
“Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above defined.” He
therefore moved to add after “bribery”: “or maladministration.” James Madison
objected that “maladministration” was too “vague.” Mason thereupon withdrew
“maladministration” and substituted “other high crimes & misdemeanors.” With
that alteration, his motion passed by a vote of 8 states to 3.31
What is striking here is that the phrase “other high crimes and
misdemeanors” was added on the floor of the Convention without discussion, or at
least without discussion that Madison thought it necessary to record. While we
must be wary of putting too much weight on negative evidence, the most natural
inference is that the delegates did not think that they were using a narrow and
technical term. Rather, they were broadening the grounds for impeachment while
avoiding (they hoped) the vagueness of the term “maladministration.”
In any event, the debates at the Convention are of only limited utility in the
present context. When the delegates were considering the grounds for
impeachment, the impeachment clause applied only to the President.32 The
President would serve for a specified term of years, so there was no need to
consider the relationship between impeachment and tenure during “good
behavior.”

31

The account in this paragraph is based on 2 Farrand, supra note 28, at 550.

The decision to make the Vice President “and other civil Officers” subject to
impeachment was made later on the same day that the words “other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” were added to the impeachments clause. See id. at 552.
32
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For an analysis of the impeachment provisions that does focus on judges, we
must look at the ratification debates, and in particular at the Federalist Papers.
Alexander Hamilton addressed the point directly in Federalist No. 79. In an oftquoted paragraph, he wrote:
The precautions for [federal judges’] responsibility are comprised in
the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for
mal-conduct by the house of representatives, and tried by the senate; and,
if convicted, may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding
any other. This is the only provision on the point, which is consistent with
the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one
which we find in our own constitution in respect to our own judges.33
Two points about this analysis deserve emphasis. First, in describing the
behavior that will justify impeachment of a judge and removal from office,
Hamilton does not use either of the phrases that are part of the constitutional text.
He does not say that judges may be removed if they fail to meet the Article III
standard of “good behavior,” nor does he quote the language of Article II referring
to “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Rather, he states
that federal judges “are liable to be impeached for malconduct.”
Hamilton was a meticulous lawyer. He was also as familiar as any man then
alive with the language of the proposed Constitution. The fact that he used the
word “malconduct” strongly suggests that he did not interpret “Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” as embracing a particularized list of
carefully defined offenses; rather, he read the language of Article II – at least
when applied to judges – as including a broader category of misbehavior.
This interpretation is reinforced by the final sentence of the quoted passage.
After summarizing “the article respecting impeachments,” Hamilton adds: “This is
33

The Federalist at 532-33 (No. 79) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
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the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary
independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our
own Constitution in respect to our own judges.” This last phrase is often cited as
describing the United States Constitution.34 However, I believe that the final
clause is much more plausibly read to refer to the New York State Constitution.
Hamilton speaks of “our own Constitution” and “our own judges,” and of course,
the Federalist Papers are addressed to “the People of the State of New York.”
What then do we find in the New York Constitution as it stood at the time of
the debates over ratification of the United States Constitution? The State of New
York had adopted its Constitution in 1777. The tenure of judges was governed by
Article XXIV. That Article provided:
... that the chancellor, the judges of the supreme court, and first
judge of the county court in every county, [shall] hold their offices during
good behavior or until they shall have respectively attained the age of
sixty years.35
The standard for impeachment was set forth in Article XXXIII. That article
provided:
That the power of impeaching all officers of the State, for mal and
corrupt conduct in their respective offices, [shall] be vested in the
representatives of the people in assembly ...36
It thus appears that Hamilton thought that “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors” was not all that different from “mal and corrupt conduct.”

34

For example, in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993), the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Rehnquist, said, “In our constitutional system, impeachment was designed
to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature.” The Court then quoted the
passage set forth in the text above, emphasizing the entire last sentence.
35

5 Francis Newton Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions 2634 (1909).
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Id. at 2635 (emphasis added).
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B. Evidence from the Commentators

The discussions in the Convention and the Federalist Papers suggest that a
federal officer – particularly a federal judge – is subject to impeachment for
“maladministration” or “mal conduct.” What kinds of offenses fall within that
category? Three leading commentators offer guidance on this point. They are
Richard Wooddeson, William Rawle, and Joseph Story.
Richard Wooddeson was an English historian who was a contemporary of
the Framers. A few years ago, the United States Supreme Court relied heavily
on Woodeson in ascertaining the meaning of the Ex Post Facto clause.37 The Court
noted that Woodeson’s treatise on the common law of England “was repeatedly
cited in the years following the ratification by lawyers appearing before this Court
and by the Court itself.” With that endorsement, Wooddeson’s treatise is a useful
starting-point.

Wooddeson’s discussion is not lengthy, nor is it as analytical as one might
hope. Nevertheless, two points emerge with some clarity. First, impeachable
offenses do not necessarily correspond to ordinary crimes. Rather,
impeachment lies for conduct that involves abuse of power by a government
official to the detriment of the community. Wooddeson wrote:
It is certain that magistrates and officers intrusted [sic] with the
administration of public affairs may abuse their delegated powers to the
extensive detriment of the community, and at the same time in a manner
not properly cognizable before the ordinary tribunals. … The commons,
therefore, as the grand inquest of the nation, become suitors for penal
justice …

37

Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522-24 (2000); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S.
607, 613 (2003) (quoting Wooddeson).
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Such kind of misdeeds … as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by
the abuse of high offices of trust, are the most proper, and have been the
most usual grounds for this kind of prosecution. … 38
Wooddeson then listed some examples of cases that might call for impeachment.
Among them were “a lord chancellor … guilty … of acting grossly contrary to the
duty of his office” and a magistrate who “attempt[s] to subvert the fundamental
laws, or introduce arbitrary power.”
Second, Wooddeson makes clear that the impeachment process is forwardlooking; it is designed not so much to punish as to safeguard the “general polity”
against further misconduct. Thus, after listing examples of misconduct,
Wooddeson emphasized “how little the ordinary tribunals are calculated to take
cognizance of such offenses, or to investigate and reform the general polity of the
state.”39
This forward-looking perspective emerges even more strongly in the treatise
published in the early 19th century by the prominent Philadelphia lawyer and
historian William Rawle. Recently the Supreme Court described Rawle’s treatise
as “influential,” and the Court relied on it in ascertaining the meaning of the
Second Amendment.40 Rawle began by asking why the United States had copied
the “system” of impeachment from a “foreign nation” whose government was so
different from ours. One answer, he said, is that
the sentence which [a court of impeachment] is authorized to impose
cannot regularly be pronounced by the courts of law. [The courts of law]
can neither remove nor disqualify the person convicted, and therefore the
obnoxious officer might be continued in power, and the injury sustained
38

Richard Wooddeson, 2 A Systematical View of the Laws of England 596-97, 601-02

(1792).
39

Id. at 602.
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District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2805-06 (2008).
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by the nation be renewed or increased, if the executive authority were
perverse, tyrannical, or corrupt: but by the sentence which may be given
by the senate, not only the appointment made by the executive is
superseded and rendered void, but the same individual may be rendered
incapable of again abusing an office to the injury of the public.41
Rawle then explained why the availability of impeachment is particularly valuable
as a means of dealing with misconduct by members of the judiciary:
We may perceive in this scheme one useful mode of removing from
office him who is unworthy to fill it, in cases where the people, and
sometimes the president himself would be unable to accomplish that
object. A commission granted during good behaviour can only be revoked
by this mode of proceeding.
The premise, then, is that the purpose of impeachment is to remove from office
“him who is unworthy to fill it.” It follows, I think, that it is a sufficient ground for
impeachment of a civil officer – particularly an Article III judge – that he has
engaged in behavior that makes him “unworthy to fill” that particular office.
Justice Joseph Story is probably the best known of the early commentators,
in part because he was also a long-serving and influential member of the United
States Supreme Court. His widely cited treatise on the Constitution contains
relatively little that directly addresses the purposes of impeachment, but we can
learn much from careful reading of his discussion of other issues. For example, in
addressing the question “whether the party can be impeached … after he has
ceased to hold office,” Story takes note of the argument that “it would be a vain
exercise of authority to try a delinquent for an impeachable offense, when the most
important object, for which the remedy was given, was no longer necessary, or

41

William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 217-18 (2d
ed. 1829) (1970 reprint).
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attainable.”42 From this we may infer that Story, like Rawle, viewed impeachment
as a process for removing from office “him who is unworthy to fill it.”
Similarly, in discussing the question whether impeachment is limited to
“official acts,” Story asks: “Suppose a judge or other officer to receive a bribe not
connected with his judicial office; could he be entitled to any public confidence?
Would not these reasons for his removal be just as strong, as if it were a case of an
official bribe?” The premise here seems to be that a judge or other officer warrants
impeachment and removal if he has engaged in behavior that results in a total loss
of public confidence in his ability to perform the functions of his office. This is not
quite the same thing as saying that the officer is not worthy to fill the office, but it
suggests a similar forward-looking perspective.
When Story does turn to the question of what constitutes an impeachable
offense, he draws heavily upon Wooddeson. Story comments approvingly that
“lord chancellors, and judges, and other magistrates” have been impeached for
“attempts to subvert the fundamental laws, and introduce arbitrary power.”43 He
goes on to take note of other impeachments that “were founded in the most
salutary public justice; such as impeachments for malversations and neglects in
office … for official oppression, extortions, and deceits; and especially for putting
good magistrates out of office, and advancing bad.” His discussion thus reflects
the twin themes that run through the writings of Wooddeson and Rawle: abuse of
power and unfitness for the particular office.

42

Story, supra note 19, § 800 at 271.
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Id. § 798 at 268.
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C. The impeachment precedents
In the history of the United States, only 13 federal judges have been
impeached by the House.44 Four (Chase, Peck, Swayne, and Louderback) were
acquitted by the Senate. Two (Delahay and English) resigned before the Senate
held an impeachment trial.45 Seven judges were convicted and removed from
office (Pickering, Humphries, Archbald, Ritter, Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon).
The two 19th century convictions – Pickering and Humphries – have little
relevance in the present context.46 As for the 20th-century convictions, each could
be viewed as offering some guidance for the present proceeding, but the various
statements made by House Managers, House Committees, and Senators all must
be read in the context of the particular accusations and defenses. In Parts V and VI
of this statement I shall consider the implications of the guilty verdicts (and
acquittals) in some of those prosecutions.
D. Conclusion
As Justice Story observed more than 150 years ago, the constitutional
category of “high crimes and misdemeanors” does not lend itself to “positive
legislation” or other comprehensive definition. But that does not mean that there
are no points of reference to guide the House in its inquiry. For example, no one
can doubt that quid-pro-quo corruption – closely akin to the “bribery” specified in
Article II – is an impeachable offense. Beyond that, I believe that the historical
materials discussed here suggest two broad (and overlapping) categories of
44

For a comprehensive account of the various impeachment proceedings, see Emily Field
Van Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 1787 to the
Present (1999).
45

In fact, Judge Delahay resigned after the House had agreed to a resolution of
impeachment but before articles of impeachment were actually drafted. See id. at 119-20.
46

Pickering was accused, in substance, of drunkenness and insanity. See id. at 91-100.
Humphries was removed from office because he supported the Confederacy. See id. at 114-19.
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conduct that may justify impeachment. The first is serious abuse of power. The
second is conduct that demonstrates that an official is “unworthy to fill” the office
that he holds.
Do Judge Kent’s actions, as revealed in the public record, fit within either of
these categories? Before turning to that question, one preliminary matter requires
attention: what weight should the House (and this Task Force in the first instance)
give to determinations made in the prior proceedings growing out of the
misconduct complaint against Judge Kent?
V. The Relevance of Prior Proceedings
As already noted, Judge Kent’s conduct has been the subject of a criminal
prosecution by the Department of Justice and a misconduct investigation by the
Fifth Circuit Judicial Council. In the criminal prosecution, Judge Kent pled guilty
to obstruction of justice and was convicted and sentenced for that offense. In
reliance on that guilty plea, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council certified its
determination that Judge Kent “by his own admission engaged in conduct which
constitutes one or more grounds for impeachment under Article II of the
Constitution.” What is the relevance of these proceedings to this impeachment
inquiry?
The short answer is that the House must exercise an independent judgment; it
is not bound by determinations of other actors in other proceedings. The longer
answer is fourfold.
Consider first the dismissal, at the request of the prosecution, of the five
counts of aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact.47 It is plain that
these dismissals do not preclude the House from impeaching Judge Kent on the
47

See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 12, at 77.
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basis of the conduct underlying these five counts. This follows a fortiori from the
fact that the House impeached Judge Alcee Hastings for engaging in “a corrupt
conspiracy” to solicit a bribe after Hastings was acquitted of the same offense by a
jury in a criminal trial.48
At the other end of the spectrum, the history of prior impeachments suggests
that the House should not rely on Judge Kent’s criminal conviction as constituting
a high crime or misdemeanor. Particularly relevant here is the impeachment
proceeding against Judge Harry Claiborne in 1986. Judge Claiborne had been
convicted of filing false tax returns. Three of the articles voted by the House (I, II,
and IV) described conduct by Judge Claiborne and said that by reason of that
conduct, Judge Claiborne warranted impeachment.49 In contrast, Article III relied
solely on the guilty verdict rendered by the jury in the criminal prosecution and the
ensuing judgment of conviction. The Senate convicted Claiborne by large margins
on Articles I, II, and IV, but acquitted him on Article III. Three years later, when
the House impeached Judge Walter Nixon, the articles of impeachment described
false and misleading statements Judge Nixon had made, but they made no mention
of the fact that Judge Nixon had been convicted of perjury in a criminal
prosecution.
So I believe that the House should not rely on the criminal conviction as a
basis for impeachment in and of itself. At the same time, however, the House can
legitimately rely on the facts admitted by Judge Kent when he signed the plea

48

See Alan I. Baron, The Curious Case of Alcee Hastings, 19 Nova L. Rev. 873 (1995).
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The Articles alleged that Claiborne knowingly and willfully falsified his income on
federal tax returns. Articles I and II did say that the facts set forth in the articles “were found
beyond a reasonable doubt by a twelve-person jury.” For further discussion of the Claiborne
impeachment, see Part VI infra.
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agreement as well as the “factual basis for [the] plea.” As part of the plea
agreement, Judge Kent “knowingly, voluntarily and truthfully admit[ted] the facts
set forth in the Factual Basis.” It is hard to see how Judge Kent could now
repudiate that solemn stipulation or dispute the facts he admitted. The House can
thus take all of the facts set forth in that “Factual Basis” as conclusively
established for purposes of this impeachment proceeding. And if the House
decides to vote articles of impeachment, the House can rely on those facts as
elements of impeachable offenses.
Finally, there are the various statements and determinations made by the
judiciary in the course of the misconduct proceedings. I have already quoted the
order issued by the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council. By the time the House considers
the Task Force report, the Judicial Conference of the United States will probably
have certified its determination that consideration of impeachment of Judge Kent
may be warranted. These determinations can appropriately be given considerable
weight. Nevertheless, at the end of the day the House must make its own
independent judgment as to whether Judge Kent’s conduct constitutes one or more
impeachable offenses. Under Article I of the Constitution, the House has “the sole
power of impeachment.” Only the House can decide when that power should be
exercised.
VI. Judge Kent’s High Crimes and Misdemeanors
The final step in the analysis is to examine the record of Judge Kent’s
behavior and to ask whether that behavior falls within the constitutional category
of “high crimes and misdemeanors.” I believe that it does, for two independent
reasons. First, Judge Kent has admitted to making false statements in a judicial
proceeding – specifically, to a special committee that was investigating a
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complaint that he had engaged in sexual harassment. This false testimony makes
him unfit to hold judicial office. Second, there is evidence of sexual misconduct
that constitutes abuse of official power and that provides further evidence of Judge
Kent’s unfitness to retain his judicial position.
A. False Statements in a Judicial Misconduct Proceeding
Judge Kent has admitted that when he appeared before the special committee
of the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council that was investigating a judicial misconduct
complaint filed against him, he “falsely testified regarding his unwanted sexual
contact with” Donna Wilkerson. False testimony by a federal judge in a judicial
misconduct proceeding falls easily within the realm of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” that warrant impeachment.
Judge Kent’s admitted conduct can be usefully compared to the conduct that
led to the conviction and removal from office of Judge Claiborne. The articles of
impeachment stated that Judge Claiborne “willfully and knowingly” filed federal
income tax returns in which he failed to report substantial income. Article IV
explained why this behavior constituted an impeachable offense:
[Judge] Claiborne, by willfully and knowingly falsifying his income
on his Federal tax returns for 1979 and 1980, has betrayed the trust of the
people of the United States and reduced confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, thereby bringing disrepute on the Federal
courts and the administration of justice by the courts.
Judge Claiborne’s dishonest behavior was totally unrelated to his role as a federal
district judge. But the Senate convicted him on Article IV (as well on the two
specific articles) by large margins. If Judge Claiborne’s actions in submitting false
information on a tax return was an impeachable offense, it would seem to follow a
fortiori that making false statements in a federal judicial misconduct proceeding is
also an impeachable offense.
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In any event, quite apart from the Claiborne precedent, two aspects of Judge
Kent’s false statements aggravate the seriousness of his transgression and make
clear his unfitness for judicial office. The first is the context: a special committee
investigation under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. That Act was
the product of careful and lengthy consideration.50 In it, Congress made a
considered decision to give the judiciary itself the primary responsibility for
investigating and remedying misconduct by federal judges. Congress made this
choice in the belief that such a system would provide greater accountability while
fully preserving the independence of the judiciary. If that system is to operate
effectively, chief judges and special committees must be able to rely on getting
truthful answers from judges who are accused of misconduct. By testifying falsely
before the special committee, Judge Kent impeded the council’s performance of its
Congressionally mandated task.
And the mischief goes even deeper. As already noted, one purpose of the
1980 Act was to allow the judiciary “to isolate the most serious instances of
misconduct and [to] set before the House of Representatives a record of
proceedings revealing misconduct which might constitute an impeachable
offense.”51 When Judge Kent testified falsely before the special committee, he
interfered with the judiciary’s ability to carry out that function. Judge Kent’s
conduct thus falls within Wooddeson’s description (echoed by Story) of behavior
that has warranted impeachment: an “attempt[] to subvert the fundamental laws.”

50

For a brief account of the legislative history of the 1980 Act, with citations to relevant
materials, see Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A
Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 189, 207 (2007).
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The second aggravating factor is the purpose of the falsehoods – to impede
an official investigation of acts of sexual misconduct that may have constituted
abuses of Judge Kent’s position as a judge. As shown in Part IV above, abuse of
power virtually defines the impeachable offense. A public official who testifies
falsely in order to cover up his abuse of power is doubly “unworthy to fill” his
office. And when the official is a judge, the unfitness is inescapable.
For these reasons, I believe that Judge Kent’s false statements to the special
committee of the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council constitute high crimes and
misdemeanors that warrant impeachment.
B. Coercive Sexual Misconduct
In the “Factual Basis for [the] Plea,” Judge Kent admitted that he “engaged
in non-consensual sexual contact” with Cathy McBroom and Donna Wilkerson
“without [their] permission.” The “Factual Basis” further establishes that Judge
Kent was a United States District Judge with his chambers at the federal
courthouse in Galveston; that Ms. McBroom was an employee of the Clerk’s
Office who was assigned to Judge Kent’s courtroom; and that Ms. Wilkerson was
a District Court employee who served as secretary to Judge Kent. From these
established facts, we may infer that Judge Kent exercised supervisory authority
over both women – that he was their boss.52
A federal judge who “engage[s] in non-consensual sexual contact” with court
employees who are his subordinates may well be abusing his power as a federal
judge in a way that justifies impeachment. However, I would be reluctant to
conclude that the admitted facts, without more, satisfy the constitutional standard
of “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Fortunately, it is unlikely that the House – or
52
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the Task Force in the first instance – will have to confront that question. Ms.
McBroom and Ms. Wilkerson spoke at the sentencing hearing on May 11. Both
women will be testifying at this Task Force hearing. If they describe their
experiences in the way they did at the sentencing hearing, and if the House credits
their testimony, the record will make a strong case for serious abuse of power that
does warrant Judge Kent’s impeachment. Particularly compelling is this account
by Ms. McBroom:
Judge Kent … attacked me in a small room that was not 10 feet from
the command center where the court security officers worked. He tried to
undress me and force himself upon me while I begged him to stop. He
told me he didn’t care if the officers could hear him because he knew
everyone was afraid of him. I later found out just how true that was. He
had the power to end careers and affect everyone's livelihood …
The last assault I had was more terrifying and threatening than ever
before. After forcing himself upon me and asking me to do unspeakable
things, he told me that pleasuring him was something I owed him. That
was it for me. He had finally won. He had broken me and forced me out.
I could handle no more of his abuse.53
The evidence would then point to the conclusion that Judge Kent relied on his
position of authority and control in the Galveston Division of the District Court to
coerce employees of that court to engage in sexual acts for his personal
gratification – and to remain silent rather than to report his attacks to a higher
authority. Such behavior is, in Wooddeson’s words, “official oppression” that
“introduce[s] arbitrary power.” It is a high crime and misdemeanor.54
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Sentencing Transcript, supra note 12, at 46-47.

Counts One through Five of the indictment allege extremely serious acts of “aggravated
sexual abuse” and “abusive sexual contact” by Judge Kent. To the extent that these allegations are
supported by evidence presented to the Task Force, they would reinforce this conclusion.
54
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It is true that none of the judicial impeachments that resulted in conviction in
the 19th and 20th centuries involved similar transgressions.55 But that is no barrier
to impeachment of Judge Kent. Justice Story emphasized that impeachable
offenses “are of so various and complex a character” that “[t]he only safe guide” is
the method of the common law. The common law looks to principle, and the
principle is the one already set forth: that impeachment is appropriate when a
public official has misused his power in a way that makes him unfit to fill the
office he holds. If Judge Kent had demanded that court employees give him 10
percent of their salaries as a condition of holding their jobs, no one would doubt
that he committed an impeachable offense. The sexual coercion described at the
sentencing hearing is no less “obnoxious,”56 and the result should be the same.
VII. Conclusion
When Justice Story delineated the impeachments that “were founded in the
most salutary public justice,” he alluded “especially” to cases where public
officials were impeached “for putting good magistrates out of office, and
advancing bad.” The record presented to the Task Force depicts conduct that
closely resembles this paradigm. Judge Kent was a “bad” magistrate. The evidence
indicates that he used his position of authority and control at the federal court in
Galveston to coerce employees into engaging in non-consensual sexual acts over a
period of years. Although there is no evidence that he attempted to “put[] good
magistrates out of office,” he did something equally pernicious: he made false
statements to his fellow judges in order to retain his position as a judge and avoid
55
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punishment for his sexual misconduct. He is “unworthy to fill” the office he holds,
and his “commission [should be] revoked” though the impeachment process.
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Appendix
The Archbald Impeachment: Article 4
Judge Robert Archbald was a member of the short-lived Commerce Court.
Thirteen articles of impeachment were voted against him by the House. Overall,
the articles accused Archbald of corrupt behavior – behavior that plainly falls
within the core of impeachable conduct. The House Committee Report
recommending impeachment said:
[Judge Archbald] has prostituted his high office for personal profit.
He has attempted by various transactions to commercialize his potentiality
as judge. He has shown an overweening desire to make gainful bargains
with parties having cases before him or likely to have cases before him.
To accomplish this purpose he has not hesitated to use his official power
and influence.57
Judge Archbald was convicted on five of the thirteen articles. Four of these
(including the thirteenth, a catchall article) alleged specific acts of corruption.
However, Article 4 did not. Article 4 involved a case that was decided by the
Commerce Court in 1912. In that case, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.
challenged a ruling by the Interstate Commerce Commission.58 Here are the
allegations in Article 4:
 While the suit was pending before the Commerce Court, Archbald
“secretly, wrongfully, and unlawfully [wrote] a letter to the attorney
for [the railroad] requesting said attorney to see one of the witnesses
who had testified in said suit on behalf of said company and to get his
explanation and interpretation of certain testimony that the said
witness had given in said suit, and communicate the same to ...
Archbald, which request was complied with by said attorney[.]”
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 Later, while the suit was still pending, Archbald “secretly, wrongfully,
and unlawfully again did write to the [attorney saying] that other
members of [the court] had discovered evidence on file in said suit
detrimental to the said railroad company and contrary to the
statements and contentions made by the [attorney].” Archbald
requested the attorney “to make to him ... an explanation and an
answer thereto[.] “
 “[Archbald] did then and there request and solicit [the attorney] to
make and deliver to ... Archbald a further argument in support of the
contentions of the said attorney so representing the railroad company,
which request was complied with by said attorney, all of which on the
part of said Robert W. Archbald was done secretly, wrongfully, and
unlawfully, and which was without the knowledge or consent of the
said Interstate Commerce Commission or its attorneys.”59
Note what is and what is not in this article. The article alleges that Judge
Archbald sought and received ex parte communications from the railroad’s lawyer
about a case pending before Judge Archbald’s court. It does not say that Judge
Archbald sought or received any quid pro quo for helping the railroad to support
its position. It does not even say what happened in the case.
Some of that information is provided earlier in the Committee Report, in the
narrative account. The Report explains that the Commerce Court decided the case
in favor of the railroad, with Judge Archbald writing for the majority (which
included three other judges) and Judge Mack dissenting. The Report adds: “In the
opinion of your committee, this conduct on the part of Judge Archbald was a
misbehavior in office [sic], and unfair and unjust to the parties defendant in this
case.”60
The Senate convicted Archbald on Article 4 by a vote of 52 to 20. It did so
even though the Article asserted, at most, an abuse of power that benefited one
59

House Report No. 946, supra note 57, at 26-27.

60

Id. at 8.

May 31, 2009

Hellman – Kent Impeachment Hearing – Page 35

side in the case and injured the opposing parties.61 The conviction on Article 4
thus supports the proposition that a judge’s use of his power or position to injure
an individual can constitute a high crime or misdemeanor within the meaning of
Article II of the Constitution.
In my statement at the hearing on the resolution to impeach Judge Manuel
Real, I noted that there was also a precedent that might be viewed as pointing in
the other direction, although not with much force. In 1830, the House impeached
Judge James H. Peck on a single article. The allegation was that Judge Peck
“unjustly, oppressively, and arbitrarily” punished a lawyer for contempt of court.62
In the Senate, there was not even a majority for conviction; the vote was 21 to 22.
The impeachment article describes what sounds like an abuse of power that
was neither criminal nor corrupt. In that respect it resembles the accusations
against Judge Real – but not the accusations against Judge Kent. Moreover, Judge
Peck’s counsel, William Wirt, acknowledged that “if [Judge Peck] knew that [the
lawyer’s behavior] was not a contempt, and still punished it as one, it would have
been an intentional violation of the law, which would have been an impeachable
offense.”63 But Wirt also argued that “a mere mistake of law is no crime or
misdemeanor in a judge.” Senators may have voted for acquittal on the ground that
the House managers had not shown more than “a mere mistake of law” without
bad intent. Judge Kent’s guilty plea and his admission of facts in the “Factual
Basis” foreclose any argument that his case resembles Peck’s.
In fact, it is by no means clear that Judge Archbald’s actions caused any harm to the
defendants. Four judges joined the opinion of the Commerce Court, and nothing in the House
Committee report indicates that the other three judges saw or were influenced by the material that
Judge Archbald obtained through his ex parte communications with the railroad counsel.
61

62

See Van Tassel & Finkelman, supra note 44, at 113.

63

See id. at 109.
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I will start with the false statements. Judge Kent has admitted
that when he appeared before the Special Committee of the Fifth
Circuit Judicial Council that was investigating a judicial misconduct complaint filed against him, he falsely testified regarding
his unwanted sexual contact with Donna Wilkerson. False testimony by a Federal judge in a judicial misconduct proceeding falls
easily within the realm of high crimes and misdemeanors that warrant impeachment.
This is so, in part, because of the context. This Fifth Circuit Special Committee was part of the mechanism that Congress itself established in the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. In
that act, Congress made a considered decision to give the judiciary
itself the primary responsibility for investigating and remedying
misconduct by Federal judges. If that system is to operate effectively, chief judges and special committees must be able to rely on
getting truthful answers from judges who are accused of misconduct. By testifying falsely before the special committee, Judge
Kent impeded the committee’s performance of this congressionally
mandated task.
And the mischief goes even deeper. A second purpose of the 1980
Act was to allow the judiciary, as one sponsor said, to isolate the
most serious instances of misconduct and to set before the House
of Representatives a record of proceedings revealing misconduct
which might constitute an impeachable offense. So when Judge
Kent testified falsely before that special committee he interfered
with the judiciary’s ability to carry out that function, a function
with constitutional underpinnings.
As if that were not enough, there is another aggravating factor.
The purpose of Judge Kent’s falsehoods was to impede an investigation of acts of sexual misconduct that even then we knew may
have constituted abuses of Judge Kent’s position as a judge. As I
develop more fully in my statement, abuse of official power virtually defines the impeachable offense. A public official who testifies falsely in order to cover up his abuse of power is doubly unworthy to fill his office. And when the official is a judge, the unfitness
is inescapable.
The record also points to a second ground for impeachment, the
acts of sexual misconduct. On this point, Judge Kent’s admissions
established that he engaged in repeated non-sex—non-consensual
sexual contact with two court employees who were his subordinates. Now, if all you had was the admissions, I think that I would
be reluctant to conclude that the admitted facts, without anything
more, satisfy the constitutional standard.
But, of course, there is more, a great deal more, the testimony
you have heard today from Cathy McBroom and Donna Wilkerson.
Based on that testimony and other evidence, you may well find
that Judge Kent relied on his position of authority and control in
the Galveston Division of the district court to coerce employees of
that court to engage in sexual acts for his personal gratification
and to coerce and intimidate them into remaining silent rather
than to report his attacks to a higher authority.
If the record shows that, there can be no question that it is impeachable behavior. It is, in the words of the authoritative com-
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mentator, Richard Wooddeson, it is official oppression that introduces arbitrary power. It is a high crime and misdemeanor.
To sum up, there is at least one ground, and probably more, for
impeaching Judge Kent. He has proved himself to be unworthy to
fill the office he holds, and I urge the Task Force to take the next
steps in the process that will enable the Senate to convict him and
remove him from office. Thank you.
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Professor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hellman follows:]
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Ms. Wilkerson, I wanted to ask you—Ms. McBroom went through
some of the chronology of how she filed the complaint around how
the disciplinary proceeding was begun. Can you tell us a little bit
about how you came to be involved in the legal proceedings, whether it was through the grand jury or otherwise, and what the course
of the legal process was?
Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, sir. I was questioned by the—initially I was
questioned by the Fifth Circuit panel, and then I was called for
grand jury testimony. I did not elaborate, I did not tell the whole
story from the beginning.
I became involved about a year and a half later. I did not want
to come forward from the beginning, but I was sought out to tell
the truth, and realized at a point that I had to tell the truth and
come forward and do the right thing. And some people close to me
also helped me make that decision that this had to be done. And
so that’s how I got involved.
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you.
Professor, I want to ask you a couple of questions. First Mr.
Baron related the part of the transcripts of the sentencing proceeding in which the prosecutor made reference to the same false
statements that were the subject of the Fifth Circuit proceeding.
The judge had also made to the FBI the same false denials. He also
made reference to those same false denials being made later to the
Justice Department. False statements to the FBI, false statements
to the Justice Department in connection with the same conduct, in
view—in your view, would those constitute impeachable offenses as
well?
Mr. HELLMAN. Yes, I think they would. And I rely here in part
on the impeachment and conviction of Judge Harry Claiborne, who
was convicted of tax fraud unrelated to his duties as a Federal
judge. I think that if that is an impeachable offense, this kind of
falsehood is an easy case after that.
Mr. SCHIFF. In terms of the testimony we heard today, can you
elaborate a little bit on whether it’s necessary to show a nexus between the sexual assaults that were described and his position of
authority or his responsibilities as a judge. Is there—and the necessity of there being a nexus—in other words, if the two women who
testified today, let’s say they didn’t even work in the courthouse
but were assaulted in the manner they described, would that be
impeachment because it also constitutes criminal conduct, or would
you need to show a nexus with his position of authority as a district judge, his position as employer? Is a nexus required for impeachment and has a sufficient nexus, in your view, been laid here?
Mr. HELLMAN. Let me take the first part of that question. It is
interesting that the question you pose was actually posed in a
slightly different context more than 150 years ago by Justice Joseph Story, who was not only a Supreme Court Justice but one of
our most authoritative constitutional commentators. And he posed
that question: Suppose you had the misconduct—he talked about
bribery rather than sexual misconduct—and it was totally outside
the official capacity. He didn’t quite answer it, but he put the question: Would we have any less confidence in that person’s ability to
hold his office simply because the misconduct occurred in a private
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capacity? The answer obviously to that question is no, you would
not have confidence in the ability to hold that office.
It seems to me, though, that you don’t have to get to that here.
Based on the testimony here, you have ample evidence of the nexus
that this—that Judge Kent was able to engage in this behavior repeatedly and over a period of time because of the position of power
he had as a Federal judge, and particularly as the only Article III
judge in that Galveston courthouse. That’s abuse of power, and
abuse of power is quintessentially what makes for an impeachable
offense.
Mr. SCHIFF. Last question. The Constitution makes mention of
judges serving during good behavior, which has been interpreted as
meaning a life term. But I wonder whether those words ‘‘good behavior’’ also add context to what the framers meant by high crimes
and misdemeanors. And the reason I ask is this: Unlike other Federal officials, Members of Congress, the President, who serve for a
term of years and then are up before the voters, the judges are
never up before the voters. There is only one method to be removed
from judicial office, and that is by impeachment.
Does that fact of there being no other remedy, no other mechanism for removal, and the discussion or the mention of good behavior mean that the framers had in mind either a different view of
what constitute a high crime and misdemeanor in the case of judicial officer, or that good behavior should inform that in some way?
Is there any discussion of whether, in the cases of someone appointed for life, that the same definition of high crimes and misdemeanors is nonetheless viewed in a different way?
Mr. HELLMAN. Unfortunately for us today, the sequence in which
the framers at the convention in Philadelphia considered these
questions doesn’t enable us to give a confident answer to that question. What is reasonably clear from the commentators over a period
of time is that the concept of high crimes and misdemeanors does
relate to the particular office because of this emphasis on unfitness
or unworthiness to hold the office. And so I think in that sense you
do look at judges a little bit differently, partly because of the particular responsibilities that they have, and partly because, as one
of the commentators did say, you cannot remove them from office
otherwise. So that does—that does put the context of the particular
office, it does make it important in that sense.
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Professor. I now recognize the gentleman
from Wisconsin, Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
just want to make sure that the record is absolutely clear. And I
would like to ask both you, Ms. Wilkerson, and you, Ms. McBroom,
in your respective written testimonies you go into some detail on
exactly what the nature of the misconduct of Judge Kent was
against you. I’m not going to ask you to repeat this in public, but
I would like each of you to say whether or not your detailed explanation is the truth and that is exactly what happened. You can just
say yes or no.
Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Ms. MCBROOM. Yes, it’s the truth.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Now, all of the instances that you described in your oral testimony, as well as in the written testimony
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which has been included in the record, took place while you were
working, and during working hours; is that correct or not?
Ms. WILKERSON. That’s true.
Ms. MCBROOM. That’s correct.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. So this was all harassment that occurred
on the job while the clock was running for both of your jobs, correct?
Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, none of these incidents occurred outside of
the courthouse, ever.
Ms. MCBROOM. Same with me.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I feel
compelled to apologize to both Ms. Wilkerson and Ms. McBroom for
the treatment that you have detailed to us today, and hopefully you
will accept the knowledge that your Federal Government, the system of the judiciary, is one overall that you can be proud of.
This is a difficult position for you to be in. And I believe it is very
important for you to know of the many jurists and Members of
Congress who stand away from the details that you have offered
here today. So thank you for your coverage, for being here today,
and accept this as an apology for, again, what you have represented to us today.
Let me just try to find out from Ms. McBroom and from Ms.
Wilkerson, did you overlap in tenure in Judge Kent’s court? What
were the years of service, again, Ms. Wilkerson? Can you give me
the year to year—I think you said something like 2001 to 2007; is
that accurate?
Ms. WILKERSON. Thank you very much for your kind words. Yes,
our tenure did overlap. I came to the court in December of 2001.
And, if I may speak for Cathy, I believe she came in July or so.
Ms. MCBROOM. It was September of 2002.
Ms. WILKERSON. So I was there for almost a year before Cathy
came.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.
And I think what you said, Ms. Wilkerson—and I will ask both
of you. You indicated that when the judicial panel came forward,
you were still at a point of intimidation and concern about your
employment. So tell me just what you did when that panel came
forward and asked you to speak to them?
Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, ma’am, absolutely. At the time of the Fifth
Circuit interviews, Judge Kent earlier—I believe my interview was
in June, June sometime—Judge Kent had already been interviewed.
Prior to that time, in between the time when Ms. McBroom filed
her complaint and the time that I was interviewed, Judge Kent
told me and told everyone that I knew of, including his lawyer, that
he had been inappropriate with me on several occasions, kisses and
hugs, a couple of times. The first few times, in his words, were that
I was sweet about it, I was nice about it, but after the second or
third time I made it very clear to him that I wanted no part of
that. He told me from the beginning that that was his story, that
was what he told his lawyer, that is what he told the Fifth Circuit.
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And then, ultimately, that is what he said that he told the FBI
when the criminal investigation began.
So that was the story that he told everyone. That is what he told
me. That is what he told his law clerks. That is what he told even
his colleagues, even the chief judge, I believe. But, in fact, that is
not what he said at all in his interview with the Fifth Circuit and
the FBI.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. So he said less than that.
Ms. WILKERSON. He said less than the story he even told me.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And when you went—did you go before the
panel?
Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, ma’am, I did.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And how did you feel the necessity—what testimony did you offer?
Ms. WILKERSON. My testimony was that that was the story, that
I had been approached two or three times, a few times. I made it
very clear that it was unwanted and it was more than a few times.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And that was on record, and——
Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, ma’am.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. Then you still were in his employ
as a personal secretary?
Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, ma’am. I let them know that the—with
that story.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. You went forward with that. Well, that is
good. I just wanted to make sure that you were at that panel and
provided that information.
Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, ma’am, I did.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Ms. McBroom, so it was 2002 that you started,
and your complaint was filed when?
Ms. MCBROOM. I believe it was filed toward the end of May 2007.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. And you went before that panel, as
well?
Ms. MCBROOM. Yes, I did.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. And likewise gave your almost complete
testimony?
Ms. MCBROOM. I gave them every piece of information I had.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. Let me thank you. And because my
time—Professor, let me ask you——
Mr. SCHIFF. Will the gentlewoman yield for just one moment? I
want to make sure we have a clear record on this, Ms. Wilkerson.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank you.
In your comments to the judicial panel, there are many things
that you did not tell them that you only disclosed later. Is that correct?
Ms. WILKERSON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHIFF. Okay. I just wanted to make sure we were clear
about that.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I thank you for clarifying. I am understanding that Ms. Wilkerson framed her testimony at least with
the items that the judge said, but, more importantly, that she was
against these—or she refused these sexual assaults or advances—
I don’t want to characterize your testimony. But you made it clear
on the record at that time.
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Ms. WILKERSON. Yes, ma’am, I made it clear there had been
more than one incident of sexual misconduct and that it was
against my wishes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I think that is clear.
Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me, I was just in the middle
of finishing very quickly with Professor Hellman.
Professor, it does seem quite clear in the law about the idea of
the impeachment standard. Where do you place the representations
about alcohol abuse and mental health concerns?
I would like you to—I am not sure what you have read or the
materials that you have read, but I do know that there is a letter
in the record from Judge Edith Jones, where they made the determination that, I guess, obviously you are upset and have some
mental issues because you are in the midst of this crisis.
Does there have any impact if this person represents or proves
that they had a mental health issue throughout the period of these
actions, as it relates to the impeachment proceeding?
Mr. HELLMAN. Well, I suppose it has a view as an impact—you
know, you can feel perhaps a little bit more sympathetic toward
Judge Kent as an individual. The question, though, for this Task
Force in the first instance and then for the House is, is he worthy
of the position he holds?
And if he is not worthy of that position, as much of this evidence
indicates very strongly, then that background, it seems to me,
should not affect that determination. Because without removal
from office, he will continue to sit as a Federal—not to sit as a Federal judge—to hold the title of Federal judge, to receive the salary
of a Federal judge, and also to occupy a position that otherwise
could be filled by a new judge appointed by the President.
So that, it seems to me, is what is primarily relevant at the impeachment stage.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Could you just—I will conclude on this question. Could you just restate the premise? Is that constitutional or
case law on ‘‘worthy to be’’? Could you——
Mr. HELLMAN. Well, there is not—I mean, one of the other
points——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want you to help us with the right question,
so that is why I am asking you.
Mr. HELLMAN. Right. Yeah, no, I think the—we don’t have case
law on this for the simple reason that the Constitution vests the
impeachment responsibility in the House and the trial responsibility in the Senate. Neither of those are judicially reviewable.
For that reason, we rely heavily on the commentators. And one
of the most authoritative commentators uses the standard of ‘‘worthiness for office,’’ that a public official should be removed if he has
shown himself to be unworthy of the office he holds. And so that
is, I believe, the question here. And obviously there is very ample
evidence on that, at this point.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman.
I thank all the witnesses very much for your testimony.
I yield back.
Ms. MCBROOM. Mr. Chairman, may I add something to my statement?
Mr. SCHIFF. Of course.
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Ms. MCBROOM. There were several incidents of sexual misconduct that were not alcohol-related. There were incidents where
I was called up to his chambers in the morning and he tried similar things, tried to grab me, kiss me, fondle, when he had not been
drinking. It was not always alcohol-related.
As a matter of fact, he would go months at a time without drinking. I can’t say that each incident was because of being intoxicated.
It was not.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is an important clarification. I thank you
for your testimony.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentlewoman. Her time has expired.
Mr. Goodlatte of Virginia?
Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. McBroom, can you describe generally the power that Judge
Kent exercised in the Galveston courthouse? Is it basically true
that it was a one-judge courthouse and he basically ran everything
and supervised everybody?
Ms. MCBROOM. Yes, it was a one-judge courthouse. I think all of
the employees were afraid to get out of line. I know when I began
my employment there, my own manager, the deputy in charge for
Galveston, sat down and talked to me and told me that I needed
to be very careful to stay under his radar, that anything could set
him off.
Mr. GOODLATTE. So there was nobody in the courthouse that you
or anybody else really would feel like you could go to complain——
Ms. MCBROOM. Not anyone who was not afraid of him.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Right. Did Judge Kent do or say anything that
communicated to you that he felt he could get away with his misconduct toward you because he was a Federal judge?
Ms. MCBROOM. Well, at the time I told you about in the wait
room, whenever I told him the security officers were right outside,
he didn’t say it was because he was a Federal judge, he just said,
‘‘I don’t care. I don’t care who hears me.’’ I just understood that it
was because he was in that position of power.
Mr. GOODLATTE. What did it take, because of this environment,
for you to be able to get the assistance or support from somebody
else? How did you follow through on this to——
Ms. MCBROOM. Do you mean when I decided to request the
transfer?
Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, yes. When did you first seek some help in
terms of dealing with the problems that you were having?
Ms. MCBROOM. Oh, I sought help from the very beginning, from
the very first incident by making my manager aware of what is
going on. And she even agreed that if there were times when I felt
threatened I could leave. She said, if you need to leave, you just
go ahead and go, take off.
But there were certain times when I actually had a lot of work
to do and he might have been in the building and may have been
looking for me, and I thought if I could temporarily just escape
until he left the office then I could stay and continue to do my
work. I know that sounds crazy, but I really did want to perform
my responsibilities. Sometimes I would just go hide in an empty office until I knew that he had gone for the day.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you.
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Ms. Wilkerson, how did the fact that Judge Kent was a Federal
judge affect you in your initial response to his actions?
Ms. WILKERSON. Well, as I said in my statement, I—what could
I do? He had made it very clear that he was the sole person in our
staff, the two law clerks and myself, he was the sole person responsible for every decision there. And I literally, when I came there,
there was no training, there was no—in fact, several times
throughout the 7 years that I was with him, I had asked to go to
several training seminars and such, and he declined those. There
was no training. I was like, who am I supposed to go to with this?
Who am I supposed to tell this to? How am I supposed to handle
this?
Mr. GOODLATTE. So you didn’t even have the resource of a supervisor——
Ms. WILKERSON. I did not have a manager. He was my manager.
He was the manager.
Mr. GOODLATTE. And how did you ultimately bring this to the attention of others, that you had been subjected to this treatment?
Ms. WILKERSON. Initially, I told the Fifth Circuit panel when
they asked me in the investigation of Ms. McBroom’s complaint.
That was the first time.
Well, let me back up. I had told two of our law clerks. One was
a career law clerk, and one was a term law clerk that had left. And
they’ve remained—she remains a co-worker and a dear friend, and
he remains a dear friend. And I had told them back when. I had
not told them the severity of it because it was too humiliating. I
had told no one, no one, the details because it was too embarrassing and humiliating. Who could I tell these things to? I hadn’t
told my husband. I couldn’t tell anyone. I personally felt I couldn’t
tell anyone.
So I told them, but—and they were in agreement, that’s awful.
And one even went so far as to say, yeah, I think he is a predator.
What are you to do? Everyone, even—and this guy, this friend of
mine that was the former law clerk, of course he was intimidated
and afraid of him also.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired. I
wonder if I might have leave to ask one question of Professor
Hellman.
Mr. SCHIFF. Of course, without objection.
Mr. GOODLATTE. It seems there are various views as to what sort
of conduct would be sufficient to justify impeachment. Can you discuss for the Task Force how the concept of abuse of trust or abuse
of position fits within the concept of high crimes and misdemeanors?
Mr. HELLMAN. Yes. Abuse of trust, abuse of a position really is
the heart of high crimes and misdemeanors.
Mr. GOODLATTE. You may want to hit your speaker button there.
Mr. HELLMAN. I think it is—I’ll bring it closer there.
What is striking to me as I listen to the very courageous testimony of Ms. McBroom and Ms. Wilkerson, this context is new—
sexual abuse, sexual assault, sexual harassment—but it fits so
closely to the description in one of the classic works by the commentator Wooddeson, ‘‘a magistrate who introduces arbitrary
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power.’’ Those were the words he used. And that is what we are
hearing about here today.
Judge Kent introduced arbitrary power into the Galveston courthouse for his own personal gratification and satisfaction. It is a sad
thing for me to hear, as somebody both to listen to the personal ordeals but also, as somebody who generally admires the Federal judiciary, that there was a judge who introduced arbitrary power,
abused his power in this way. That is the essence of an impeachable offense, in my view.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. And I think it is a sad thing for all
of us to hear.
And I want to especially thank Ms. McBroom and Ms. Wilkerson
for being willing to step forward and testify here today. It is no—
I don’t think any of us can in any way underestimate the stress
that this must put you under. But we thank you very much. You
are providing a great service to your country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Pierluisi of Puerto Rico?
Mr. PIERLUISI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to extend my heartfelt thanks to both of you, Ms.
McBroom and Ms. Wilkerson, for appearing before us. Few individuals will ever experience the depth of pain and humiliation you
have felt because of Judge Kent’s conduct. You’re both brave
women for bringing his inexcusable behavior to light.
As I see it at this point in this proceeding, Judge Kent’s refusal
to resign immediately from his office adds insult to injury. He already insulted you; he insulted all of us who believe in the American justice system. He insulted everybody. But now he injured everybody. Now he is insulting us.
One thing is to cause the damage he caused to you, and now it
is quite another and it is really flabbergasting that he wants to
keep earning a Federal salary while even incarcerated. It makes no
sense. He is forcing this Congress to take action. And that’s what
this is all about.
Having said that, I imagine that no action that Congress takes
can make you whole for the unspeakable harm Judge Kent caused
you. Both of you mentioned the devastating impact that he has
caused in your personal and professional lives. So on a human—
on a personal basis, I just want to make sure, does this process
help you in healing? Does it help you in moving on? I just want
to hear from you on that.
Ms. MCBROOM. I find it extremely helpful, and it is helping me
to have closure, first of all, to know that I live in a country where
it does matter. In America, sexual assault is a crime. Sexual assault in a workplace is even more of a crime, in my opinion.
And it is—I just feel—I feel good about myself for coming forward, and I am so grateful that everyone is taking notice and that
there is going to be action taken. It is very healing. Thank you very
much.
Mr. PIERLUISI. You’re welcome.
Ms. WILKERSON. Thank you for your kind words, as well.
Yes, this process, although very intimidating and out of my comfort zone for sure, I do feel that this process will help. I have kept
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thinking over this time, you know, the next step, the next step, the
next step of trying to move forward and heal, and it seems like it
couldn’t get any crazier. This whole thing has been surreal.
But all I can say is that, with each step forward, as painful as
it is and as painful as the past has been, I am moving closer and
closer to, you know, some sunshine in my days and to a healing
process that, like Cathy says, people are taking notice and must
take notice that this cannot and should not ever be acceptable or
tolerated and that the system will maybe eventually, maybe not
when we think it needs to be done, but will take care of situations
such as this. So thank you very much.
Mr. PIERLUISI. You’re welcome.
I have no further questions.
Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Lungren of California?
Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Professor Hellman, your testimony is very helpful in terms of establishing the parameters within which we work. And you made it
very clear that it is the Congress, both the House in terms of impeachment and the Senate in terms of trial, who make the final determination. And while precedent is important and commentators
are important, it is the collective judgment of the House and the
Senate that prevails and is not appealable.
You were asked a question about good behavior because of the
reference to the Constitution. I think as we try and understand
that, you go back to the Founding Fathers and you look at the commentary, which I think is pretty important, called the Federalist
Papers, where I think it was Madison who said that ‘‘the Constitution is established for a virtuous people. It would be insufficient for
any other.’’ And he was talking generally about the public. But I
think it is also guidance in terms of those who are in official office.
He also went on to say, ‘‘If men were angels, we wouldn’t need
a government.’’ But obviously we aren’t and we need a government.
But he also said, ‘‘Once you have selected the people who are to
govern, you have to watch those who are governing.’’ And that is
our requirement here. We’re supposed to watch those who are governing. And, in this case, we are given the responsibility to make
judgments with respect to the conduct of those who have lifetime
appointments.
And I don’t think it is a close question as to whether or not what
was related by these two witnesses here needs to have a nexus to
employment. If one, while being a Federal judge, conducts himself
in the way they have described, which in my estimation are prima
facie cases of sexual assault or in some cases rape, there need not
be a direct nexus to the job. That makes it even worse. So I think
that is a separate and appropriate basis upon which we can impeach.
Secondly, it seems to me, what they have described here is a case
in which someone abused his power not only with respect to these
two women, but if you look at the conduct in its entirety, it is obvious to me that he has used his influence to corrupt the process in
which other employees look the other way. And that, to me, is one
of the worst acts that someone with authority can have. They essentially corrupt the actions of others so that they either—they are
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aiding and abetting or, in the least, they are looking the other way.
And when you have a Federal institution in a particular community which is the Federal court, to have the power to corrupt that
entire workplace and the people who work within it is sufficient to
find within the definition of high crimes and misdemeanors, in my
judgment.
To the ladies who testified here, what you have described is a
reign of judicial terror. And if we do not act here, we not only do
not do justice to you, but we send a message loud and clear to the
rest of the country that, when one gets a lifetime appointment as
a Federal judge, they are above the law.
And if we allow him to sit in his incarcerated state and continue
to draw his salary and then get his pension, what we have said is
we are not serious about the fact that no person is above the law;
that, along with the tremendous authority you get to be a Federal
judge with lifetime tenure, the question of good behavior really
doesn’t mean anything.
It either means something or it doesn’t mean something. You
don’t have to be, with all due respect, Professor, a professor or a
Member of Congress or a lawyer to look at two words, ‘‘good behavior,’’ and kind of figure out what they mean. And what you two ladies have described here is the absence of good behavior.
I happen to have a 91-year-old mother, I’ve got four sisters, I
have a wife, I have two daughters. What you have described here
is so unacceptable that Members of Congress have got to act. This
cannot be allowed to go forward without an official response by this
Congress.
And to let someone, first, try and get off on some sort of dodge
of his own physical disability or mental disability or, secondly, to
resign a year from now so that he can retain his salary is totally
unacceptable. And I want to thank the two of you for the courage
that you have displayed, because God knows it is not easy for you
to come forward and what it’s done to your families.
But we have to act based on the information you gave us. This
is not a difficult case. It is a clear-cut case. This man should not
be on the bench now; he shouldn’t have been on the bench. And we
have the obligation to act to make sure that not only he is on the
bench but anybody else who would seek to be on the bench or serve
on the bench would never give a thought toward acting the way he
acted toward you and others.
So you have done a great service to this country by coming forward. I know it’s not easy, but there are a lot of people in this
country who respect you for what you’ve done and thank you for
what you’ve done. And now it is our obligation to do the job that
must be done based on the information that you have given us.
Thank you very much for being here.
Ms. MCBROOM. Thank you.
Ms. WILKERSON. Thank you very much.
Mr. SCHIFF. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gonzalez?
Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I’m going to piggyback a little bit on what Mr. Lungren said. And
what is the amazing thing, Ms. Wilkerson and Ms. McBroom, is
both of you all have, in responding to my good friend from Puerto
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Rico’s question about how you’re finding this experience and you’re
saying, ‘‘Well, it has been painful, but it is gratifying that the system is working.’’ But I hope you realize the system is only working
because you came forward. The system would not have worked.
And so, when we talk about courage and bravery, that’s what we
are all discussing here.
The second thought that I have is, look, sexual assault is a violent act. Had the judge struck you, it would have been a simple
case. And we need to be reminded of that. Unfortunately, in today’s
society, things are taken in context and such in a way that we
don’t treat violent acts the same. But this was a violent act, first
and foremost. But your contribution is making sure that people are
held accountable.
And the last thought is, tremendous adversity, that you come out
of this stronger, that the family comes out stronger. And that
would be all of our wish for you. And I think that is where you’re
headed. If you don’t get there soon, I think you will get there.
Professor Hellman, let me ask you quickly—because I do want to
take the sensitivity, sensibilities of the witnesses, of the victims
into account. I want them fully vested in the process to the extent
necessary, because to continue different forums and different hearings does take its toll. It’s just human nature.
But in your paper, in your written statement, you have—let me
start off. ‘‘The short answer is the House must exercise independent judgment. It is not bound to determinations of other actors
in other proceedings. The longer answer is fourfold,’’ and then you
go into examples. And you have, ‘‘So I believe that the House
should not rely on the criminal conviction as a basis for impeachment in and of itself. At the same time, however, the House can
legitimately rely on the facts admitted by Judge Kent when he
signed the plea agreement as well as the factual basis for the plea.’’
Preceding that paragraph, though, you allude to two instances,
one where a judge pled not guilty and was acquitted, but nevertheless we use what was in the charging instrument as a basis to impeach him. The second example you use is where a judge—this is
Judge Clayburn, in essence, where he was found guilty, but that
wasn’t the basis for impeachment; it was the underlying facts.
But in this case—in those two cases, these judges pled not guilty.
Isn’t there some significance here in that we may be able to get to
A to B if, in fact, we recommend to the full Committee that articles
of impeachment be filed and they accept our recommendation?
Can’t we get from A to B in the simplest form possible? And that
is relying on the plea—everything that was encompassed, the finding of guilty to a felony, a Federal felony, and the underlying facts
that are encompassed in the statement, as you suggest, the factual
basis for the plea?
Mr. HELLMAN. Well, on the false statements, I do think that the
facts he has admitted to, without more, state an impeachable offense on the false statements. It is on the sexual misconduct that
I think the admitted facts, without more, don’t quite get you from
A to B. On the obstruction, false statements count, yes.
And, of course, all you need is one article that the Senate convicts by two-thirds and he is removed from office. That’s all you
need.
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Mr. GONZALEZ. The reason that I state my question is simply, if
the full Committee moves forward with the impeachment, then you
know the role of the House of Representatives. It is still up to the
House of Representatives to return, basically, like, an indictment.
We are a big grand jury; that’s the way I always think of us, anyway. Then it goes for trial before the Senate.
And to have to put witnesses to any extent or degree back under
the microscope at a national level, at this point, is something, if at
all possible—this is my own personal opinion; it is definitely not
anything I have shared with any of the Members of the Task
Force—that if we don’t have to do it, we shouldn’t have to do it.
And we can still, if, in fact, impeachment is appropriate and the
finding is appropriate, then we move forward.
Can’t we do that with what we have here, without fully engaging
the witnesses and having them being part and parcel of that process?
Mr. HELLMAN. I appreciate and understand exactly the point you
make. And it is my view that, if all—if all you want is to assure
that Judge Kent will be—I suppose I should not say ‘‘assure.’’ It requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate, and each Senator will use
his or her independent judgment. But it does seem to me that the
admitted facts on the obstruction count that Judge Kent pleaded
guilty to are sufficient to impeach him and convict him on that
without the need to get into the details, the witnesses on the sexual misconduct.
Now, you may have other reasons for wanting to impeach him,
as some of these comments here suggest. But if the simple question
is, can he be removed from office, should he be removed from office
solely on the basis of these false statements which he has admitted,
I do believe that is sufficient.
Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, without objection, just 1 minute. I wanted to ask
the witnesses——
Mr. SCHIFF. Without objection.
Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much.
You’re aware of the letter this Committee has received from
Judge Kent. I think you all have alluded to it, and you’ve been able
to read it.
I’m going to ask you, since you’re familiar with Judge Kent, his
demeanor and the manner in which he treated individuals that
came before his court, if a party came before him, did Judge Kent
hold that party accountable for their acts?
And let me go further than that. And if someone came before
him, a party or a defendant, and said, ‘‘Oh, if you rule against me
or if you find me guilty, it will render me penniless and without
the health insurance I desperately need to continue treating my diabetes and related complications as well as my continuing mental
health problem; please take these realities into consideration to the
extent that you may,’’ would it have altered his judgment? What
would he have done?
Ms. MCBROOM. He would have dealt with them severely. He
wouldn’t have appreciated the fact that they were trying to play on
his sympathies.
Ms. WILKERSON. That’s true.
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Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much.
Ms. WILKERSON. He would have thrown some expletives in there.
There would be no question whatsoever.
Mr. GONZALEZ. I appreciate it.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SCHIFF. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Gohmert of Texas?
Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I do thank the witnesses for being here.
I did want to ask, we received a June 2, 2009, letter addressed
to the President from Judge Kent. It says ‘‘personal and confidential,’’ but apparently he didn’t just send it to the President; it was
provided for all of us. I don’t know what he means, ‘‘personal and
confidential,’’ if he expected us to consider this.
But I don’t know, Professor, if you know, or perhaps the Chairman knows, what the effect would be if we did nothing and allowed
him to resign effective a year from now on June 1, 2010?
Mr. SCHIFF. If the gentleman will yield?
Mr. GOHMERT. Sure.
Mr. SCHIFF. He would remain a Federal judge for the course of
the year. He would draw his salary while incarcerated for the year.
And my understanding, although we would have to get further
analysis, he could change his mind a year from now and decide to
un-resign.
Mr. GOHMERT. But if he resigned, would that end his ability to
get a pension?
Mr. SCHIFF. I believe—and counsel can correct me if I’m wrong—
that if he resigns from the bench or is impeached from the bench,
he would not collect his pension. Under the circumstances of his
years of service and his current age, my understanding is that he
would not collect——
Mr. GOHMERT. He wouldn’t get his pension.
Mr. SCHIFF. If he resigned prior to a certain age, which he has
not attained, or is impeached.
Mr. GOHMERT. So if he did resign effective a year from now, he
does not get a pension, correct?
Mr. SCHIFF. I think that is correct.
Mr. GOHMERT. Counsel was nodding. Is that correct?
Okay. All right. Thank you.
Well, as a former judge, I go into a hearing like this understanding, first of all, you’ve had a Federal judge plead to obstruction of justice, which indicates a great deal of injustice from the
judge. But since we are supposed to take this up as a separate body
and look at a separate punishment, basically, of removing him, impeaching him, actually charging him and pursuing elimination,
which means no pension, no salary, yet we have to take a fresh
look.
So I’m constantly looking for issues of credibility. And you’ve
come in here today; you haven’t been examined toughly. I’m sure
that that kind of stuff has happened, as you’ve been questioned by
the FBI and people all through this time. But he pled guilty to obstruction of justice, and one might normally think, well, that is sufficient unless we were to find that there was an obstruction—I
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mean, there was some type of miscarriage of justice in the obstruction plea.
But examining the plea transcript, I don’t find anything that indicates a miscarriage of justice. And in looking for other issues,
perhaps of credibility, of mental culpability, mens rea, or contriteness which a judge likes to consider—and is it true contriteness,
or is this a manipulative type of contriteness? Are there issues that
indicate true rehabilitation? You have both indicated that this is a
manipulative judge. So what indications do we have that that may
be the case even today or that he is contrite truly and he is no
longer being manipulative if the evidence is there?
Well, it certainly appears that when you have a judge who lied
to the judicial counsel, as we heard, who voluntarily sought to
make appearances in which he could lie, that that is clear indication of great manipulation. And, as we have seen in the transcript,
you know, he again repeated the same lies. He said he had been
honest with the FBI in December of 2007 and that—he went on to
say that Person A—you know, acting with Person A is nonconsensual is absolute nonsense, which we later know he has admitted
was actually not absolute nonsense but actually was a fact. So,
again, misrepresenting. Person B, he said the defendant falsely—
the transcript said falsely stated that he attempted to kiss her on
two separate occasions, when, in fact, it was over a much longer
period.
So, again, he is still trying to manipulate through this process up
to the actual sentencing hearing through this transcript. But other
indications, too—you know, we know this is an articulate guy. We
can take judicial notice of his opinions and the things that he has
said in court. He’s got a good vocabulary. He is articulate enough.
But then we know he also—because I want to know, is he really
contrite? Is he really feeling—has he been rehabilitated after what
he has been through?
We know he forced the Fifth Circuit to act upon his request to
retire with a disability, knowing what he had done, already admitting to obstruction of justice. Boy, that is real manipulation. And
then you come in here and we have this letter of resignation, June
2nd, addressed to the President, to retire a year from now, which
he could withdraw at any time. If we took this and said, ‘‘Oh, well,
great, he is going to retire, he is going to resign, and so we don’t
have to deal with it anymore’’—but he could withdraw that at any
time within the next year? That is real manipulation, not making
it final, not making it clear that he is resigned to the fact that he
needs to resign.
And then you compare that to the letter that’s dated June 1 to
this Committee, which the Chair and counsel have already indicated comes not under oath, so should not carry the credibility of
someone who came in and took the oath. But in that letter, he ends
up saying that—as my friend from Texas said, that removal from
office ‘‘will render me penniless and without the health insurance
I desperately need to continue treatment.’’ Well, that is contradictory to his resignation. He completely contradicts himself. On one,
he says he’s got to have this. And then the next day sends a letter
saying, ‘‘I’ll resign next year,’’ which gives us a clear indication he
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has no intention to resign next year. This is further manipulation,
and it is rather insulting.
So, last, we come to the issue—and I appreciate so much the insights my friend from Texas had into this, Mr. Gonzalez. But this
not only has gone on beyond contriteness, but it is further manipulation such that I don’t think we should stop even if we get a letter
of resignation. I think this man needs to be impeached. Because
when you have a Federal judge who would do all he can to get paid
for doing the job of a Federal judge while he is in prison for committing a crime while he is a Federal judge, this is somebody who
needs to be impeached. And a message needs to go out to others
that you’re not going to play games with this panel, you’re not
going to play games with this Congress. You try to manipulate us
like you have others, then we are going forward. You want to resign, you do it before you try to manipulate this body, or otherwise
we are taking it to the wall.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you.
The gentleman yields back.
I just want to conclude by thanking you, Ms. McBroom and Ms.
Wilkerson, again, for your courage in coming forward. I was a law
clerk for a Federal judge in Los Angeles, a judge of great integrity.
And it grieves me enormously to hear what you suffered in your
courtroom and the courthouse. It is unimaginable.
And I want to echo the comments of my colleagues, that it is a
tremendous public service that you came forward. Had you not
come forward, Judge Kent would be sitting on the bench right now
and, very conceivably, mistreating or assaulting other people in the
courthouse. You’ve put an end to that. So you’ve done a great public service in coming forward. We are very grateful. We know how
hard it must be, and I wanted to thank you again.
We will be scheduling a fall meeting of the Task Force very
promptly to discuss whether to recommend articles of impeachment
to the full Committee for its consideration.
And I want to thank my colleague, the Ranking Member of the
Task Force, Bob Goodlatte, for his work.
I want to thank you, Professor Hellman.
And, with that——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. SCHIFF. Yes, the gentlewoman from Texas?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is there a time frame for both our discussions
and then the procedure moving to the Senate? Obviously, it has to
go to the full Committee. Do we have a range of time? I’m making
an inquiry.
Mr. SCHIFF. Yes, it is my intention to move very quickly to reconvene this Task Force to discuss what recommendation we want to
make to the full Committee. It will then be up to the full Committee to schedule a full Committee meeting to act upon the recommendations of the Task Force.
If the Task Force recommends articles of impeachment and the
full Committee then votes to approve those articles, it would then
be up to the floor schedule to schedule floor action. But it would
be my intention, not in the least of which because I don’t think we
want this to drag on and further prevent our witnesses from
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achieving some form of closure but also for the reasons that my colleagues have explained, that we move promptly and expeditiously.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. A further inquiry is on the full Committee
proceedings. Are all parties invited, or do they act upon our Task
Force recommendations? Are parties invited again to the full Committee procedurally?
Mr. SCHIFF. No. My understanding would be that the Task Force
will make a recommendation to the full Committee. We will deliberate as in a legislative markup, but we will not have witnesses at
the full Committee hearing.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. If I just may have a moment of personal privilege, if you would, let me just—these are constituents that live in
and around the Houston area, and, obviously, the story saddens
me.
But thank you again for being such good people and willing to
expose yourselves. And thank you for also understanding that there
are good people around you who care about you. And you have allowed us to clear the air for other workers, not only in our area,
in the Houston-Galveston area, but around the Nation. So thank
you so very much for your contributions.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentlewoman.
This hearing of the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the Task Force was adjourned.]
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